- Will Iran target an Arab country by September 15, 2026?59¢
- Will Iran target an Arab country by September 30, 2026?80¢
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Iran targets an Arab country through a qualifying military action between market creation and the listed date, Arabia Standard Time (AST). Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” Qualifying Arab countries are as follows: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Iran, directed at a qualifying Arab country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Military action that consists primarily or exclusively of munitions that are intercepted before impact will still qualify if they constitute a qualifying military action during the specified timeframe; whether the munitions were intercepted, where the munitions landed, and whether damage resulted will not be considered. A military action will be considered directed at an Arab country if it is directed at the terrestrial territory of an Arab country, including any internal waters. Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (AST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. At the end of the third calendar day, if conflicting reports remain, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Iran and the qualifying Arab country and a consensus of credible reporting.
Iran's strategy of striking Arab states hosting U.S. military assets has driven repeated direct attacks in 2026, including recent ballistic missile and drone operations against Jordanian and Emirati bases in late August. These followed earlier waves targeting GCC energy infrastructure, ports, and civilian sites during the February–April phase of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, with Iran framing Gulf states and Jordan as extensions of American power. Proxy actions via Houthis against Saudi shipping and Iraqi militias have added pressure. Trader assessments reflect ongoing escalation risks tied to potential U.S. strikes, the September 30 Iraq withdrawal deadline, and fragile diplomacy involving Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and regional mediators, while noting Gulf air defenses and shifting Arab alignments as limiting factors.