- 到2026年底，德尔茜·罗德里格斯会成为委内瑞拉事实上的领导人吗？95¢
- 迪奥斯达多·卡贝略·隆东会在2026年底成为委内瑞拉的实际领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，埃德蒙多·冈萨雷斯会成为委内瑞拉事实上的领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，弗拉迪米尔·帕德里诺·洛佩斯会成为委内瑞拉的事实领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，马可·鲁比奥会成为委内瑞拉的事实领导人吗？<1¢
- 丹·凯恩会在2026年底成为委内瑞拉的事实领袖吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，弗兰克·多诺万会成为委内瑞拉的事实领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，委内瑞拉会没有实际领导人吗？<1¢
- 尼古拉斯·马杜罗在2026年底还会是委内瑞拉的实际领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，玛丽亚·科琳娜·马查多会成为委内瑞拉实际上的领导人吗？3¢
- 2026年底，霍尔赫·罗德里格斯会成为委内瑞拉事实上的领导人吗？<1¢
- 到2026年底，唐纳德·特朗普会成为委内瑞拉的实际领导人吗？<1¢
This market will resolve to the individual who de facto holds and exercises the powers of the head of state of Venezuela on December 31, 2026 at 12:00 PM ET. For the purposes of this market, “de facto holds” refers to the individual who exercises primary governing authority over the Venezuelan state at that time, including effective control over the armed forces, national institutions, and core executive decision-making, regardless of formal title, constitutional designation, or international recognition. Formal appointment, recognition by the United Nations, or recognition by foreign governments is not required. If more than one individual claims to be head of state, this market will resolve to the individual who demonstrably exercises primary governing control within Venezuela’s territory at the specified time. Indicators of de facto authority may include control over the armed forces and security services; control over executive ministries and state administrative institutions; enforcement of national laws; issuance of binding national directives; and effective control over the capital and core state infrastructure. Symbolic status, foreign recognition without domestic control, nomination without effective authority, or expired prior service will not qualify. If no individual exercises effective governing control at the specified time, this market will resolve to “No Head of State”. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting assessing who exercises effective governing authority at the specified time.
Delcy Rodríguez holds a commanding position in trader assessments for Venezuela’s de facto leadership at the end of 2026 following the January 2026 U.S. military operation that removed Nicolás Maduro and her subsequent swearing-in as interim president by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. She has retained control of key institutions, secured military backing, and advanced cooperation with the United States on oil production and sanctions relief, while the National Assembly and ruling party structures remain aligned with her faction. Recent U.S.-facilitated talks with opposition figures have produced limited judicial reforms without altering her executive authority. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include formalized multi-party elections, a reversal in U.S. engagement, or internal power shifts within Chavista networks before year-end.