US-Cuba tensions have escalated through expanded sanctions, an energy blockade, and legal actions such as the October 2026 Florida arrest warrant against former leader Raúl Castro for a 1996 incident, which Cuban officials denounced as politically motivated. Miguel Díaz-Canel continues to govern from Havana without reported threats to his personal security or direct US targeting for detention. Limited bilateral contacts focus only on migration, while broader relations remain defined by economic pressure and Cuban assertions of sovereignty. Structural barriers—including Cuba’s territorial control, absence of extradition mechanisms, and lack of operational signals for capture—constrain realistic pathways to US custody by year-end, aligning with trader pricing that reflects these practical and jurisdictional realities rather than imminent regime-level change.
如果 Miguel Díaz-Canel 在 2026年12月31日 23:59 ET 之前的任何时候被美国政府拘押,本市场将结算为“是”。否则,此市场将判定为“否”。 如果美国政府人员(包括军方、CIA、其他机构人员,或在美国政府直接授权下行事的承包商)以身体方式拘留、逮捕、抓获 Miguel Díaz-Canel,或以其他方式实际接管对他的拘押控制权,无论地点或持续时间如何,都将视为 Miguel Díaz-Canel 已被美国政府拘押。 在自愿且未被拘留的情况下进行访问、与美国政府人员互动,或 Miguel Díaz-Canel 出现在美国空间(包括船只、基地、设施或会议)内,均不符合条件。但是,如果 Miguel Díaz-Canel 自愿向美国人员投降并接受美国拘押,则符合条件。 由非美国实体(包括盟军或合作伙伴部队)实施的拘押不符合条件,除非美国人员亲自在场并接管对 Miguel Díaz-Canel 的拘押控制权,或者之后将他移交至美国拘押之下。 此市场的判定依据将是美国政府的官方信息,以及可信报道形成的共识。
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