- 到2026年底，德爾西·羅德里格斯會成為委內瑞拉的實際領導人嗎？95¢
- 到2026年底，迪奧斯達多·卡貝略·隆登會成為委內瑞拉的實際領導人嗎？<1¢
- 埃德蒙多·岡薩雷斯會在2026年底成為委內瑞拉的事實領導人嗎？<1¢
- 在2026年底時，弗拉迪米爾·帕德里諾·洛佩斯會成為委內瑞拉的事實領袖嗎？<1¢
- 馬可·魯比奧會在2026年底成為委內瑞拉的事實領袖嗎？<1¢
- 到2026年底，丹·凱恩會成為委內瑞拉的實際領導人嗎？<1¢
- 到2026年底，法蘭克·多諾萬會成為委內瑞拉的實際領袖嗎？<1¢
- 到2026年底，委內瑞拉會沒有實際領導人嗎？<1¢
- 尼古拉斯·馬杜羅在2026年底時會是委內瑞拉的事實領導人嗎？<1¢
- 到2026年底，瑪麗亞·科麗娜·馬查多會成為委內瑞拉的實際領導人嗎？3¢
- 豪爾赫·羅德里格斯會在2026年底成為委內瑞拉的實質領袖嗎？<1¢
- 到2026年底時，唐納·川普會成為委內瑞拉的實際領導人嗎？<1¢
This market will resolve to the individual who de facto holds and exercises the powers of the head of state of Venezuela on December 31, 2026 at 12:00 PM ET. For the purposes of this market, “de facto holds” refers to the individual who exercises primary governing authority over the Venezuelan state at that time, including effective control over the armed forces, national institutions, and core executive decision-making, regardless of formal title, constitutional designation, or international recognition. Formal appointment, recognition by the United Nations, or recognition by foreign governments is not required. If more than one individual claims to be head of state, this market will resolve to the individual who demonstrably exercises primary governing control within Venezuela’s territory at the specified time. Indicators of de facto authority may include control over the armed forces and security services; control over executive ministries and state administrative institutions; enforcement of national laws; issuance of binding national directives; and effective control over the capital and core state infrastructure. Symbolic status, foreign recognition without domestic control, nomination without effective authority, or expired prior service will not qualify. If no individual exercises effective governing control at the specified time, this market will resolve to “No Head of State”. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting assessing who exercises effective governing authority at the specified time.
Delcy Rodríguez holds a commanding position in trader assessments for Venezuela’s de facto leadership at the end of 2026 following the January 2026 U.S. military operation that removed Nicolás Maduro and her subsequent swearing-in as interim president by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. She has retained control of key institutions, secured military backing, and advanced cooperation with the United States on oil production and sanctions relief, while the National Assembly and ruling party structures remain aligned with her faction. Recent U.S.-facilitated talks with opposition figures have produced limited judicial reforms without altering her executive authority. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include formalized multi-party elections, a reversal in U.S. engagement, or internal power shifts within Chavista networks before year-end.