- 胡塞武裝能否在2026年10月31日之前成功襲擊航運？2¢2%
- 胡塞武裝能否在2026年11月30日之前成功襲擊航運？62¢62%
Houthis' October 15, 2026, announcement ending their Red Sea campaign against commercial shipping has sharply reduced near-term probabilities of new kinetic strikes or seizures, following a UN report confirming no incidents since early September. Earlier 2026 escalations—including July's Saudi-linked blockade, September territorial gains at Mokha port and Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and missile strikes on tankers—had driven war-risk insurance premiums higher, prompted carriers to divert Asia-Europe volumes around the Cape of Good Hope, and cut Suez Canal transits and revenue while pressuring Saudi crude exports via Red Sea routes. These dynamics elevated freight rates and bunker costs amid rerouting, with Bab el-Mandeb oil flows already strained by the separate Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Traders now weigh whether lingering Saudi-Houthi clashes or leadership shifts could trigger renewed attacks before October 31 resolution, against improving but still elevated maritime security advisories.
規則
如果胡塞武裝在市場建立後至指定日期 下午11:59 AST（UTC+03:00）期間，對商船發動動能打擊或以其他方式奪取其控制權，本市場將判定為「是」。否則，此市場將以「否」結算。 不考慮對軍艦的攻擊。 以船隻為目標、但遭攔截或因其他原因未直接擊中船隻的飛彈／無人機攻擊，不予計入，無論碎片是否造成損害。 奪取控制權是指胡塞武裝強行登上商船並控制該船。 符合條件的事件包括但不限於無人機和飛彈打擊、空襲，以及胡塞武裝人員親自實施的動能行動，例如以武力奪取船隻。 此市場結算的主要依據將是可信報導所形成的共識。 如果發生動能事件，但在指定日期 下午11:59 AST，該事件是否可歸因於胡塞武裝人員仍存在重大疑義，本市場可延長開放 3 個日曆日，AST。如果屆時仍無法確認該事件的責任歸屬，本市場將判定為「否」。
機器翻譯。如有爭議，以原文為準。