China has intensified military signaling through unannounced naval and rocket force drills in early November, including DF-26 launches, area-denial operations around Taiwan, and reports of a submarine-launched ICBM test from the Yellow Sea, yet these activities remain framed as routine training rather than escalatory strikes. Beijing’s emphasis on rapid-response capabilities and new systems such as the DF-61 occurs alongside Xi Jinping’s recent statements prioritizing peaceful reunification and ahead of the APEC summit, where a Trump-Xi meeting is anticipated. Traders assess that these factors, combined with the short remaining window and absence of acute cross-strait triggers, support a high probability that no ballistic missile launch meeting market resolution criteria will occur by December 31.
如果中國在市場建立後至 2026年12月31日、下午11:59 ET 之間發射彈道飛彈,此市場將判定為「是」。否則,此市場將以「否」結算。 只有發射彈道飛彈才符合判定為「是」的條件,包括洲際彈道飛彈(ICBM)、潛射彈道飛彈(SLBM)及彈道反艦飛彈。 發射其他系統,例如巡弋飛彈、地對空飛彈(SAM)、多管火箭發射系統/火箭炮、魚雷等,均不符合判定為「是」的條件。 市場判定將以可靠來源公開提供的資訊為依據,例如官方政府聲明、聯合國等國際監測機構的報告,或知名國際媒體的報導。
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