- Will Iran sabotage undersea internet cables by December 31?12¢12 %
Iranian officials and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesmen issued explicit threats in mid-to-late October 2026 to target undersea communications cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or Israel resume strikes. Two senior security sources told Reuters that detailed operational plans exist, including measures to obstruct repairs and prolong outages, while IRGC deputy Yadollah Javani publicly named seven specific cables as potential targets. The warnings occur against a backdrop of an eight-month conflict now in a diplomatic lull ahead of the U.S. midterms, with Iranian propaganda amplifying scenarios of banking and network disruption. Analysts note that Hormuz routes carry less than 1 percent of global bandwidth, limiting worldwide effects, though several Gulf states lack viable alternative paths. No confirmed attacks have occurred, and execution appears tied to renewed escalation rather than standalone action.
Reguli
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or an Iranian proxy group physically damages undersea internet cables between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. For the purposes of this market, Iranian proxy groups are: any organization directly controlled by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Houthis ("Ansar Allah"), Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization, and Harakat al-Nujaba. Only physical damage to undersea internet cable infrastructure will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects. A qualifying incident must be deliberately caused by, or result from an attack or other deliberate action by, Iran or an Iranian proxy. Damage caused as a result of an Iranian or Iranian proxy attack on a vessel will qualify. Attempted attacks that do not result in damage will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. The occurrence, cause, and attribution of qualifying cable damage will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, cause, or attribution of relevant cable damage, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, cause, and attribution of the damage based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (ET) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the damage. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. If, at the end of the third calendar day, conflicting reports remain as to the occurrence, cause, or attribution of the damage, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution source for this market will be credible reporting.