The Cuban regime's institutional continuity under President Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party, supported by military and security structures, underpins trader consensus against a 2026 fall. Despite the January 2026 cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies following Maduro's removal, resulting in prolonged blackouts, a projected 15% GDP contraction, and localized protests, Havana has sustained governance through economic reforms, defense exercises, and diplomatic resistance to U.S. sanctions. Analysts highlight the regime's centralized control, elite cohesion, and historical adaptation to external pressure as key stabilizers, with no verified elite defections or mass mobilization capable of triggering rapid change by year-end. Upcoming U.S. political shifts and limited opposition organization further reinforce the 91.5% implied probability on "No."
如果古巴共产党(PCC)在 2026年12月31日 23:59 ET 前不再对古巴行使事实上的政府控制权,此市场将判定为“是”。否则,此市场将判定为“否”。 判定为“是”必须明确且有广泛报道证实,PCC 对古巴政府的历史性控制已出现重大转变。这可能包括推翻或解散 PCC,并由新政府或过渡当局取而代之;通过宪法取消 PCC 作为唯一执政党的地位,随后将政府权力移交给另一个政治实体;或举行多党制全国选举,并由此产生不受 PCC 控制的政府等事件。判定为“是”不要求正式解散 PCC,但前提是 PCC 不再对古巴行使事实上的政府控制权。 PCC 内部的领导层变动(包括更换第一书记),或仍保留 PCC 对古巴事实上的政府控制权的政府改革,均不足以构成判定依据。领土部分丧失、民间动乱,或叛军及流亡团体的挑战,均不符合条件,除非 PCC 不再管理古巴境内的大多数古巴人口。 主要判定依据将是可信报道形成的共识。
机器翻译。如有争议,以原文为准。