- イランは2026年9月11日までにアラブ諸国を標的にするでしょうか？77¢
- イランは2026年9月18日までにアラブ諸国を標的にしますか？79¢
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Iran targets an Arab country through a qualifying military action between market creation and the listed date, Arabia Standard Time (AST). Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” Qualifying Arab countries are as follows: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Iran, directed at a qualifying Arab country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Military action that consists primarily or exclusively of munitions that are intercepted before impact will still qualify if they constitute a qualifying military action during the specified timeframe; whether the munitions were intercepted, where the munitions landed, and whether damage resulted will not be considered. A military action will be considered directed at an Arab country if it is directed at the terrestrial territory of an Arab country, including any internal waters. Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (AST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. At the end of the third calendar day, if conflicting reports remain, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Iran and the qualifying Arab country and a consensus of credible reporting.
Recent Iranian missile and drone strikes on U.S. facilities in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE—launched in direct response to American attacks on Iranian coastal and IRGC targets—represent the dominant driver of trader assessments. These operations, occurring in late August and early September 2026 amid renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities over the Strait of Hormuz, have struck Arab Gulf states hosting American bases and drawn official condemnations from multiple Arab governments. Iran has framed the actions as retaliation while signaling limits tied to whether strikes originate from those territories. Key variables ahead include the pace of further U.S. or Israeli responses, any diplomatic openings with Gulf Cooperation Council members, and whether proxy activity from Iraq or Yemen escalates independently. Market pricing reflects the skin-in-the-game consensus on whether such cross-border targeting continues through the resolution window.