- Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb effettivamente chiuso entro il 30 settembre?7¢
- Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb effettivamente chiuso entro il 31 agosto?1¢
- Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb effettivamente chiuso entro il 31 dicembre?18¢
- Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb effettivamente chiuso entro il 31 ottobre?11¢
- Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by September 15?3¢
This market will resolve to “Yes” if IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (“Arrivals of Ships”) for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait less than or equal to 10 for any date between market creation and the listed date. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. This market will resolve as soon as IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait equal to or below 10, or once data has been published for the listed date and no such value has been published. If no data has been published for the listed date within 14 calendar days (ET) after that date, this market will resolve based on the data published up to that point. Revisions to previously published data points made before data has been published for the listed date will be considered; however, they will not disqualify a previously published data point from qualifying. Revisions made after data has been published for the listed date will not be considered. The resolution source for this market will be IMF PortWatch, specifically the “Arrivals of Ships” data published for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730 , including both the chart and downloadable files.
Houthi forces declared a targeted maritime blockade against Saudi-linked vessels on July 20, 2026, amid the broader U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict that began February 28. This has driven sharp reductions in Bab el-Mandeb transits—down roughly 20-40% for commercial traffic overall and steeper for tankers and Saudi-origin flows—prompting reroutes via the Cape of Good Hope, higher war-risk premiums, and increased dark (AIS-off) movements. Specific attacks, including ballistic missile strikes on Saudi tankers in late July and the August 11 double-tap on the Egyptian-owned Tihamah that killed six, have elevated risks, while the group has stated the action applies only to Saudi interests and does not constitute a full strait closure. Traffic persists at reduced volumes for non-targeted vessels, including some Chinese-linked carriers that have secured passage assurances. Yemen's government has warned of potential Houthi efforts to seize coastal areas near the strait, but no comprehensive shutdown has occurred. These dynamics reflect trader focus on sustained Houthi strike capability, Saudi export alternatives, insurance availability, and any de-escalation signals in the regional conflict.