This market will resolve according to the total number of transit calls that IMF Portwatch reports for the Strait of Hormuz for all days from August 17, 2026, through August 23, 2026, inclusive. Transit calls include container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. Ships not reported by IMF Portwatch will not be considered. This market will resolve as soon as all relevant data has been published. If the relevant data is not published within 14 calendar days of the specified date, this market will resolve based on the most recent data published up to that point. In case of obvious data integrity issues (i.e., erroneous data), the market may remain open until the end of the third calendar day (ET) after the date on which such data is first released to allow for corrections. Data integrity issues refer only to clerical or other similar errors in the underlying data, and do not include cases where IMF Portwatch differs from alternative sources. Only revisions to previously published data points made before all relevant data has been published will be considered. The resolution source for this market will be IMF Portwatch, specifically the transit calls data published for the Strait of Hormuz at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730, both in the chart and through downloadable files.
Recent attacks on tankers, including ADNOC vessels, combined with stalled U.S.-Iran talks and U.S. threats of sustained economic and naval pressure, have driven shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to multi-month lows. Data from Kpler and MarineTraffic show daily transits averaging around 12 in mid-August 2026—far below the pre-crisis baseline of 60–130 vessels—with several days recording five or fewer passages and no crude oil shipments visible on certain dates. This sharp contraction reflects heightened war-risk premiums, AIS-dark operations, and shipowners rerouting or delaying voyages amid IRGC activity and competing claims over safe passage. The closely matched market-implied probabilities for fewer than 25 versus 25–49 transits for the week of August 17 capture the uncertainty around whether the recent slowdown will persist or see modest stabilization if diplomatic signals improve. Key swing factors include the trajectory of tanker attacks, any U.S. naval posture adjustments, and visible changes in insurance costs or port arrivals, all of which directly influence the volume of commercial traffic willing to transit the chokepoint. Oil benchmarks such as Brent have reacted to these supply-chain frictions, underscoring the waterway’s role in global energy flows.